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Risk Considerations in Supply Response: 
Implications for Counter-Cyclical Payments’ Production Impact 




This study investigates the role of risk in farmers’ acreage decisions in the Northcentral region 
by revisiting an earlier study by Chavas and Holt and tests the null hypothesis regarding the 
effects of wealth and draw out implications for farmers’ risk attitudes.  Estimated model results 
are used to examine counter-cyclical payments’ production impact for major field crops. 
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Risk Considerations in Supply Response: 




The 2002 Farm Act offers producers income support and revenue risk reduction through counter-
cyclical payments (CCPs).  CCPs are made available to producers of covered commodities 
whenever the effective price─the sum of the direct payment rate and the national average farm 
price or loan rate (whichever is higher)─is less than the target price.
1   CCPs received by 
producers do not depend on current commodity production, but on historical base acreage and 
payment yields.  However, the risk-reducing effect of CCPs would be related to farmers' 
enterprise selection because the payment rates vary with commodities' market prices.  Hence, 
farmers' acreage decisions could have bearing on the extent to which revenue risks are reduced 
for the farm household and CCPs may have an effect on farmers' production decisions.  But by 
how much? 
 
The potential for CCPs to cause production and trade distortions due to wealth and revenue risk 
reduction effects has been noted in the ongoing agricultural trade policy debate.  A seminal study 
by Chavas and Holt (AJAE, 1990) has been cited as the primary evidence of production and trade 
distortions caused by decoupled payments (such as direct payments) and partially decoupled 
payments (such as CCPs).  The Chavas-Holt study shows that in the context of acreage decisions 
under risk, wealth and revenue risks are important variables that are statistically significant in 
affecting U.S. corn and soybean acreage decisions.  However, that study is outdated because data 
used in the empirical model extend only through the mid-1980's.  Yet, the policy environment 
                                                 
1 For a back-to-back comparison of the 2002 Farm Act with the previous farm legislation, title by title, the reader is 
referred to Young and Westcott.   2
has evolved−away from supply controls toward planting flexibility in recent years.   More 
importantly, studies to date are inconclusive.  In subsequent research in the mid-1990’s, Holt 
himself found "no compelling evidence of risk effect on farmers' supply response" for corn and 
soybeans in the North Central region (M. Holt, “A Linear Approximate Acreage Allocation 
Model,” NCSU working paper partially supported by ERS Cooperative Agreement no. 43-
3AEK-7-80091, 2000).   
 
In this paper we investigate the role of risk in U.S. farmers’ acreage decisions by revisiting the 
Chavas-Holt study.  We also examine whether CCPs, as a risk-reducing policy instrument, have 
an impact on these decisions.  Specific objectives are to: 1) estimate an empirical model of 
supply response under risk for the Northcentral region, 2) test the null hypothesis regarding the 
effects of wealth and revenue risks on farmers' supply response and draw out implications for 
farmers' risk attitudes, and 3) use the empirical model to determine whether and under what 
market conditions CCPs have an impact on farmers’ acreage decisions for major field crops in 
the Northcentral. 
 
The theoretical framework developed by Chavas and Holt serves as the basis for developing an 
empirical model of supply response under risk in this study.  Aggregate supply response is 
estimated for major program crops (corn, soybeans, and wheat) in the Northcentral region, 
including Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Michigan.  
Truncated variances and covariances of per-unit output prices are estimated to reflect price 
support offered to producers through marketing loan programs.  The effects of risk and initial 
wealth on supply response for major field crops are also investigated.    3
The estimated empirical model is then used to determine whether and under what market 
conditions CCPs have an impact on plantings of corn, soybeans, and wheat in the region.  First, 
given a market price scenario, moments of commodity price distributions are compared with and 
without CCPs.  In the absence of CCPs, price truncation effects are limited to commodity loan 
programs.  With CCPs, the payments add another truncation to commodity price distributions, in 
addition to the truncation provided by the loan program.  CCPs’ potential truncation effects are 
estimated by recognizing that CCPs are based on base acreage and payment yields, not current 
production.  Second, the effects on moments of the price distributions that are attributed to CCPs, 
together with price and risk elasticities estimated from this study, are then used to estimate 
CCPs’ production impacts.  
 
Previous Related Studies 
Since the mid-1970s, a number of studies have addressed the role of risk in farmers’ production 
decisions.  Many of these studies measured risk in terms of variance, standard or absolute 
deviation of commodity prices or net returns.  A central question remains: Does risk matter in 
farmers’ acreage decisions?  This section briefly reviews previous related studies, particularly 
focusing on aggregate supply response analyses for major field crops and recent studies that 
address the effects of income support programs on farmers’ acreage decisions.  
 
In a study of farmers’ supply response for California major field crops (including wheat, grain 
sorghum, barley, cotton, and rice) in the mid-1970s, Just developed an adaptive expectation 
geometric lag model for analyzing farmers’ acreage decisions and measured risk in terms of 
subjective variances of gross returns.  He found risk to be important in farmers’ acreage   4
decisions for most of these field crops, especially those that were less strictly regulated (such as 
feed grains) than cotton and rice by government stabilization programs and wheat.   
 
However, the adaptive expectation geometric lag model presumes a restrictive lagged response 
pattern arising from the use of a constant coefficient of expectation.  To provide flexibility in the 
lagged response pattern, Lin developed a polynomial lag risk response model which was used to 
estimate farmers’ acreage decisions for Kansas wheat.  Risk of per-acre returns was found to be 
statistically significant—a 1-percent decrease in the moving average standard deviation of gross 
returns would lead to an increase of 0.06 percent in wheat planted acreage.   
 
Traill uses a polynomial lag to measure onion acreage response at the national level.  He utilizes 
an iterative procedure to first estimate the distributed lag effects of the past price variables, then 
formulates the risk observations by quantifying the absolute deviations of the actual and 
expected prices.  Expected risk is then specified as a distributed lag function of past observations 
of risk.  He found that a simple two-year moving average standard deviation of past actual prices 
performs at least as well as the iterative procedure. 
 
In 1990, Chavas and Holt developed an acreage supply response model for U.S. corn and 
soybeans under expected utility maximization.  The model maximizes expected utility for a farm 
household subject to a budget constraint.  They found the household’s acreage decision is a 
function of expected net returns for the own and competing crops, second and (possibly) higher 
moments of the distribution of the net returns, and farm household wealth.  Untruncated expected 
prices were assumed to follow an adaptive expectation scheme.  Symmetry restrictions across the   5
corn and soybean equations were imposed in estimating the coefficients of the expected net 
returns for the competing crop.  Unless risk neutrality is assumed, homogeneity restrictions, 
which are often imposed in estimating the deterministic supply response model, do not apply in 
the Chavas-Holt risk response model.  Chavas and Holt used farm value of proprietor’s equity as 
the proxy for initial wealth, an explanatory variable, and gave particular attention to the 
truncation effects of commodity loan programs on the distribution of commodity prices.  
Truncated mean, variance, and covariance values were used to compute key explanatory 
variables in the acreage equations--expected net returns, variance and covariance of commodity 
prices.  
 
Risk and wealth variables were found to play an important role in households’ corn and soybean 
acreage decisions, based on annual time-series data during 1954-85 for U.S. corn and soybeans.  
Risk is measured in terms of the variance and covariance of commodity prices, where the 
variance is a weighted sum of the squared deviations of past prices from their expected values, 
with declining weights.  Variances and covariances of commodity prices were found to be 
statistically significant in most cases, although acreage elasticity with respect to the variance of 
own prices were small─ -0.087 for soybeans and not statistically significant for corn.  Elasticities 
with respect to initial wealth were also relatively small (0.087 for corn and 0.270 for soybeans) 
but statistically significant, consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) (Just and 
Pope; Sandmo).  
 
In 1998, Hennessy developed a theoretical model to show the production effects of income 
support programs, coupled and decoupled, in input and output markets that are characterized by   6
uncertainty.  His study decomposes the production impacts of income support programs under 
uncertainty into wealth, insurance, and coupling effects.  Under the assumption of DARA, the 
wealth and insurance effects of many income support programs increase optimal input levels 
even for decoupled programs. 
 
Hennessy showed that an increase in income support increases optimal input levels under three 
conditions: 1) support-augmented income must increase with the source of uncertainty, 2) risk in 
the stochastic variable depresses the optimal input levels for the risk-averse producers so that a 
risk-reducing policy can mitigate the negative effect of risk on optimal input levels, and 3) the 
impact of a marginal increase in support must be decreasing in the stochastic variable, ensuring 
that the support policy actually acts to mitigate risk.  For decoupled programs which tend to 
increase expected profit as well as to reduce the risk, DARA is sufficient to ensure an increase in 
the optimal input level as the magnitude of support increases.  In other words, decoupled income 
support programs may in fact affect production decisions and output.  Hennessy simulated the 
model for a 400-acre Midwestern continuous corn farm and found that the removal of a 
decoupled target price program for corn would reduce nitrogen use by 7-10 percent and 
production by 1.3-2.5 percent.  The optimal input level would be slightly larger under a coupled 
program. 
 
In 2004, Goodwin and Mishra provided an empirical evaluation of the acreage effects of U.S. 
farm program benefits, particularly the Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) and market loss 
assistance payments.  Their study results suggest that PFC payments could have an effect on   7
producers’ production decisions because as wealth (due to fixed farm payments) increases, those 
with DARA risk preferences will be willing to assume more risk (Hennessy). 
 
Goodwin and Mishra developed an empirical model of aggregate supply response for corn, 
soybeans, and wheat in the Corn Belt using county-level data during 1998-2001.  The expected 
harvest-time farm price is calculated from new crop futures prices adjusted by basis at the state 
level.  The estimated results suggest positive supply elasticities for soybeans and wheat, but the 
corn acreage response to own price is not statistically significant.  Contrary to expectations, the 
expected soybean farm price is shown to be positively associated with corn acreage.   PFC 
payments are shown to be positively related to soybean acreage (with an elasticity of 0.018) and 
statistically significant, even though soybeans were excluded from base acres. However, the 
payments are not statistically significant for corn and wheat acreage decisions.  Market loss 
assistance (MLA) payments are shown to be positively related to corn and soybean acreage 
decisions, but not wheat, again, even though soybeans did not qualify for MLA payments.  The 
farm financial risk variable, measured as the ten-year coefficient of variation on net farm income 
for the county, is not statistically significant in any of the three equations. 
 
The Acreage Response Model 
The acreage response model employed in this study is an extension of earlier studies, particularly 
that of Chavas and Holt.  The empirical model employs state-level data during 1991-2001, an 
update from the 1954-85 dataset used in the Chavas and Holt study.  
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Theoretical Considerations 
The theoretical framework of Chavas and Holt is adopted in this study primarily because it 
bridges a wide gap between the economic theory of risk behavior and aggregate supply response.  
The conceptual framework assumes that the farm operator household is the decision unit, which 
maximizes expected utility subject to a budget constraint.  Consumption expenditures are limited 
to expected net returns from farm operations and exogenous income generated either from off-
farm income or non-farm investment.  Assuming a monotonically increasing utility function for 
the farm household, the optimization problem implies that acreage decisions are a function of the 
expected net returns for the own and competing commodities, second and (possibly) higher 
moments of the distribution of net returns for these crops, and initial wealth (including off-farm 
sources).  Symmetry restrictions apply to cross-net return coefficients for the competing crops 
across the acreage equations (Barten and Vanloot). 
 
The Empirical Model 
The empirical model in this study utilizes State-level data to estimate supply responses for corn, 
soybeans, and wheat in the Northcentral region.  Farmers’ acreage decisions are estimated by 
pooling time-series (1991-2001) with cross-section (individual States in the region) data.   
The time-series data cut across both 1990 and 1996 farm legislations, but, to a large degree, 
reflect the market orientation of policies throughout the entire period.  Under the 1990 farm 
legislation, government payments were largely irrelevant for the cropping choices for program 
participants once the decision to participate in the program was made (Lin et al.).  In addition, 
the 15-percent normal flex acreage appeared to be adequate for most farmers to respond to 
changing market price signals (Evans).  A shift toward market signals and planting flexibility 
characterized the 1991-95 period, even before the introduction of full planting flexibility under   9
the 1996 Farm Act.  The pooling provides 88 observations, sufficient to overcome the degree-of-
freedom problem. 
 
The empirical model treats all acreage response equations as a system of acreage allocation 
decisions under a risk environment, similar to the equations estimated by Chavas and Holt.  The 
model, with acreage share (Si) of the major field crops in each state as the dependent variable, 
has the following structure: 
                       3                      3                         3 
S1 = a11 + b1i ∑ NRTi+ c1i  ∑ VARi + d1i ∑ COVij + e1 W1 + f1 Z1 +µ1 
                    i=1          i=1                     i≠j,1  
                                         3                       3                        3  
S2 = a21 + b2i ∑ NRTi+ c2i ∑ VARi + d2i ∑ COVij + e2 W2 + f2 Z2 +µ2 
                                        i=1                   i=1                     i≠j,1 
                                         3                       3                        3 
S3 = a31 + b3i ∑ NRTi+ c3i ∑ VARi + d3i ∑ COVij + e3 W3 + f3 Z3 +µ3 
                                        i=1                    i=1                    i≠j,1 
  
where S1    = the share of combined (corn, soybeans and wheat) acreage planted to 
                           corn (%), 
  
 S 2   = the share of combined acreage planted to soybeans (%), 
 
 S 3   = the share of combined acreage planted to wheat (%), 
 
 NRTi  = expected net returns ($/ac) for ith commodity (i=1, corn; i=2, soybeans; i=3, 
                           wheat) 
 
 VARi   = variance of commodity prices ($/bu) for ith commodity  
 
 COVij  = covariance of cross-commodity prices ($/bu) between ith and jth commodities 
                           for i≠j 
 
 W i  = farm operator household net worth (in billion dollars) for ith farms  
 
 Z i  = other explanatory variables (e.g., idled acreage under the acreage reduction 
    program (ARP) of the 1990 farm legislation) for ith acreage equation  
        with i=1, corn; i=2, soybeans; and i=3, wheat     10
The use of acreage shares explicitly recognizes that as the share of the combined cropland 
planted to one commodity (say corn) increases, that expanded corn acreage has to come from 
cropland planted to major competing crops, such as soybeans or wheat (that is, the sum of the 
acreage shares equals one in the model specification).
2  Constraining the sum of acreage shares 
equals one, however, does not necessarily imply that cropland is fixed.   
 
(Untruncated) expected net returns equal the expected farm price times the trend yield, minus a 
covariance term between crop yields and farm prices and variable costs of production for the 
Northcentral region.  In this context, both crop yield and farm price are considered as two 
random variables, which are often negatively correlated.  Instead of relying on the adaptive  
expectation scheme which is built from lagged farm prices, the empirical model in this study is 
forward looking in that farmers base expectations on futures prices.
3  The expected price is the 
new-crop, harvesttime futures price, observed in the month when planting decisions are made.  
In the cases of corn and soybeans, the expected prices are derived from the December corn 
futures price and the November soybean  futures price at the Chicago Board of Trade in mid- 
March.  In the case of winter wheat, the expected price is derived from the July new soft red 
winter (SRW) wheat futures price at the Chicago Board of Trade in mid-October, previous year.  
For spring wheat in Minnesota, the expected price is the September futures price at the 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange in mid-May, current year.
4  Expected prices are further adjusted by 
a State-specific, 5-year average basis (the difference between futures prices and cash prices 
                                                 
2 Over time, total cropland is largely fixed.  For example, cropland planted to the three major field crops ranged 
from 22.05 million acres to 22.65 eight out of the 11 years (1991-2001) in Illinois.    
3 An interesting alternative is to use USDA’s projected marketing year average farm prices as reported in World 
Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates 
4 This applies to spring wheat planting decisions in Minnesota, the only spring wheat producing state in the 
Northcentral.  However, the expected price in mid March is used in corn and soybean equations, instead.     11
received by farmers in the month right before the delivery month of the futures) to allow for 
price differentials across States, and to arrive at the farm-price equivalents.  The trend yields are 
estimated for each year of the period 1991-2001 and for each State using data for 1975-90 
initially, but augmented by additional annual yield data as they successively became available to 
producers.  This estimation allows producers to fully utilize past yield data prior to any growing 
season during the study period to form their expected yields. 
 
The expected variance of (untruncated) farm prices is a weighted sum of the squared deviations 
of past farm prices from their expected values, with a weighting scheme of 0.5 for t-1, 0.3 for t-2, 
and 0.2 for t-3.  This weighting scheme is consistent with the lagged response pattern in the 
Kansas wheat acreage response study by Lin and the corn and soybean study by Chavas and 
Holt.   
 
Instead of using the farm value of proprietor equity as a proxy for initial wealth, this study uses 
“farm operator household net worth” (FOHNW), as reported by USDA’s Agricultural Resource 
Management Survey (ARMS), to measure the household’s initial wealth.  FOHNW is a more  
accurate measure of initial wealth because it consists of net worth from both farm and nonfarm 
sources.  In 1995, off-farm financial assets accounted for 18 percent of total farm household 
assets, up from 14 percent in 1990 (Mishra and Morehart).  Similarly, nonfarm net worth in 1999 
accounted for 31 percent in 1999, up from 15 percent in 1993, due primarily to the stock 
market’s strong performance.  This percentage declined to around 20 percent in recent years. 
   12
In addition to the planting flexibility provision, the 1990 farm legislation continued the acreage 
reduction program (ARP) for program crops, such as corn and wheat.  For example, during the 
first part of this study period, corn programs required that ARPs be set aside by participants as 
specific percents of their corn base acreage from production: 7.5 percent in 1991, 5.0 percent in 
1992, 10.0 percent in 1993, and 0 percent for 1994-95.  In the case of wheat, the ARP was 15 
percent and 5 percent of wheat base acreage in 1991 and 1992, respectively.  No ARP was 
required for wheat programs during 1993-95.  The 1996 farm legislation discontinued annual 
ARPs for corn and wheat programs. 
 
Finally, a time trend variable is included in the wheat acreage equation to capture the systematic 
effects of any omitted variables on acreage decisions over time.  During the 1990s, wheat planted 
acreage in the Northcentral region had been trending down, just as had occurred in other regions.  
The long-term declining share of U.S. wheat in the world market simply reflected stiff foreign 
competition that U.S. wheat encountered in the marketplace.  Expansion of wheat exports from 
the Black Sea area, such as Russia and Ukraine, has had a systematic negative effect on U.S. 
wheat planted acreage needed to meet export market demands.  Also, conservation reserve 
program (CRP) has removed wheat cropland from production—about one-fourth of CRP acres in 
the USDA baseline are cropland that has historically been planted to wheat.  
 
Truncation of Commodity Loan Programs 
Commodity loan programs provided producers with price support at the loan rate levels during 
the study period 1991-2001.  Under marketing loan programs, producers received marketing loan 
gains or loan deficiency payments (LDPs) when farm prices fell below the loan rates.  Farmers 
sold their program commodities at market prices, but received marketing loan gains or LDPs   13
which were the differences between the loan rates and posted county prices.  Hence, the 
commodity loan program truncated (from below) the producer’s subjective price distribution at 
the loan rate.  Mean values of truncated commodity price distributions were used to calculate the 
expected net returns, an explanatory variable in the acreage equations.  Similarly, variances and 
covariances of the truncated price distributions were used to measure risk facing producers’ 
acreage decisions.   
 
The truncated distribution of commodity prices is the part of the distribution above the loan rate.  
A normal distribution for truncated commodity prices is assumed in this study because it is in 
this context that the effects of multivariate truncation on price distributions are best understood 
(Johnson and Kotz, Maddala, Chavas and Holt, Greene).  Based on the first and second moments 
of the truncated normal distribution developed in Greene (chapter 20), truncated mean, variance, 
and covariance of commodity prices are estimated.  Since the truncation is from below, the 
expected price of the truncated price distribution is greater than the original (untruncated) one.  
Also, truncation reduces the variance of the price distribution. 
 
To illustrate, figures 1 and 2 show the effects of loan rates on the mean and variance of 
commodity price distributions for 2001 corn and soybeans in Illinois.  In the case of corn, the 
$1.89/bu loan rate in 2001 truncated the corn farm price distribution in Illinois from below, and  
the loan rate was located to the left of the mean of untruncated price distribution, where the 
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          Figure 1.  The effects of loan program truncation on corn farm price distribution in 
                           Illinois, 2001  
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Figure 2.  The effects of loan program truncation on soybean farm price 
                distribution in Illinois, 2001   15
truncated price distribution is estimated at $2.36/bu, up $0.10/bu from the untruncated one.  
Variance of the truncated price distribution is estimated at $0.08/bu, down from $0.13/bu. 
  
The effects of the loan program on the mean and variance of 2001 soybean price distribution in 
Illinois are more dramatic than the case of corn.  The loan rate truncated the soybean price 
distribution from below at the loan rate of $5.26/bu, but the loan rate was higher than the mean 
of the untruncated price distribution.  The truncation increased the mean value of the soybean 
price distribution from $4.34/bu under the untruncated one to $5.45/bu.  Variance of the 
distribution declined dramatically from $0.24/bu to $0.03/bu, approaching the “risk-free 
farming” scenario portrayed by Babcock and Hart.  Clearly, the marketing loan provided a strong 
safety net (in terms of price protection) for Illinois soybean producers in 2001. 
 
Truncation of price distributions by commodity loan programs had more noticeable effects on 
the mean and variance of the commodity price distributions towards the last part of the study 
period—1999, 2000, and 2001 (fig. 3 & 4).  Prior to 1999, untruncated expected commodity 
prices were substantially above the loan rates, keeping the effect of loan programs on moments 
of the price distribution at a minimum.  However, since 1999, untruncated expected farm prices  
were either slightly above the loan rates or actually below the loan rates, making the effects on 
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Estimated Results  
The acreage response model is estimated using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) as a 
system, which is asymtotically equivalent to maximum likelihood.  Symmetry restrictions 
require that cross-net return regression coefficients across the acreage share equations be equal, 
that is, b21 = b12, b31 = b13, b32 = b23.  These restrictions are usually imposed in commodity acreage 
equations.  In the context of acreage share equations, this same theoretical restriction applies if 
total cropland (including minor crops) is assumed to be largely fixed over time.   
 
As anticipated, truncated expected net returns for corn and soybeans are highly significant with 
expected signs for own and cross effects in both corn and soybean acreage share equations.  The 
cross effects reflect a strong competitive relationship between corn and soybean plantings in the 
Northcentral (table 1).  The expected net return for wheat also has the expected sign, but is not  
significant in wheat acreage share equation.  Acreage own-price elasticities obtained from this  
study are generally comparable with those reported in other studies.  Based on the procedures 
described in Lin et al., corn’s own-price elasticity in the corn acreage share equation is estimated  
at 0.331, compared with 0.158 reported by Chavas and Holt and 0.248 by Lin et al. for the 
Northcentral region.  Similarly, soybeans’ own-price acreage elasticity is estimated at 0.253 in 
this study, compared with 0.441 reported by Chavas and Holt and 0.298 by Lin et al. for the 
Northcentral.   
  
Results in this study suggest that the effects of risk on supply response for major crops in the 
Northcentral region are not strong.  Of all estimated coefficients of variance and covariance 
variables, only the variance of soybean prices in soybean acreage equation and the covariance   18
Table 1─Estimated regression coefficients in corn, soybean, and wheat acreage share equations  
in the Northcentral region, 1991-2001 
      Acreage  share  planted  to─ 
I t e m           C o r n     S o y b e a n s        W h e a t  
            
Intercept              79.239     19.003     572.840 
                    (2.746)
***   (1.543)
***   (85.297)
*** 
 
NRT1           0.072    -0.064    -0.001 
     (0.024)
***   (0.020)
***   (0.008) 
 
NRT2      -  0.064      0.060    0.0003 
                                                            (0.020)
***           (0.019)
***   (0.007) 
 
NRT3       -  0.001    0.0003      0.010 
     (0.008)    (0.007)    (0.006) 
 
VAR1          3.411    -11.917      -- 
(21.851)  (18.272) 
 




VAR3          --        --    -2.437 
           (2.148) 
 
COV12      -26.772  32.087        -- 
(28.957)  (24.101) 
COV13          --        --    13.841 
           (7.133)
* 
 
COV23          --        --    -3.345 
           (3.577) 
 
Wealth      -0.191    0.397    1.546 
     (0.108)
*             (0.062)
***             (0.242)
*** 
 




Trend          --        --    -0.287 
           (0.043)
*** 
aFigures in parentheses below the parameter estimates are standard errors.  A single, double, or 
triple asterisk denotes significantly different from zero at 10%, 5%, or 1% significance level. 
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between corn and wheat prices in wheat acreage equation are statistically significant.
5  Soybeans’ 
own-variance risk elasticity in soybean acreage equation is estimated at -0.044 in this study, 
compared with -0.087 reported by Chavas and Holt and -0.06 reported by Lin for Kansas 
wheat acreage response.  As noted by Just and Pope, this limited risk response observed from the 
empirical analysis may not be attributed entirely to farmers’ risk aversion.  Physical constraints 
for allocable inputs, financial asymmetries and costs of adjustments caused by imperfect capital 
markets and consequences of bankruptcy, and possible nonlinear risks due to intertemporal 
decisionmaking in the adoption of technology could all contribute to the risk response.  It is 
conceivable that the limited risk response found in this study may reflect changes in the 
structural characteristics of the U.S. farm sector in recent decades—larger, commercial farms 
increasingly accounted for the bulk of the production of U.S. grains and oilseeds.  These larger, 
commercial farms place more focus on net wealth accumulation in the long-run and less in 
avoiding production and market risks in the short-run. 
 
All coefficients of the initial wealth variable are statistically significant in the acreage share 
equations.  Overall, an increase in initial wealth would lead to an expanded acreage of all major 
field crops combined, which implies that farmers in the Northcental region exhibit decreasing 
absolute risk aversion (DARA).  In other words, as farmers become wealthier, their risk aversion 
is lessened (that is, they are willing to assume more risk).  For all the major field crops (corn, 
soybeans, and wheat) combined, initial wealth elasticity is estimated at 0.03 (0.139 for soybeans, 
                                                 
5 The relatively more drastic risk-reducing effects from soybean marketing loans during the latter part of 1991-2001 
period were associated with a steady upward trend in soybean share of combined soybean and corn acres in the 
United States (Lin).  Expected variances for corn and wheat were smaller than that for soybeans during 1991-97.  
These factors might explain why risk is significant only in soybean equation.    20
0.003 for wheat, and -0.063 for corn).
6  The negative wealth effect for corn, while surprising, 
may reflect effects of programs during part of the estimation period.  Additionally, if soybeans 
were to expand in the Northcentral region, part of this expansion would come from cropland 
planted to corn.  In comparison, Chavas and Holt reported a wealth elasticity of 0.087 for corn 
and 0.270 for soybeans.  
 
Annual ARP requirements under the 1990 farm legislation applied to corn and wheat programs 
during 1991 and 1995.  In the case of corn, more idled acres under ARP tended to lower corn 
acreage, but the coefficient is not significant.  In contrast, higher idled acres contributed to 
greater wheat share in the Northcentral, which probably reflects the negative effect of ARP on 
corn acreage.  Higher idled acres of corn land resulting from a larger level of ARP, such as the 
10 percent in 1993, would lower corn planted acreage.  Since corn accounted for about one-half 
of the combined corn-soybean-wheat acreage and wheat typically was less than 5 percent in the 
Northcentral, a reduction in corn acreage caused by ARP would greatly raise wheat share of the 
major field crops acreage.    
 
Implications for CCPs’ Production Impact 
The above estimated acreage response results provide a basis for analyzing the effects of CCPs 
on acreage planted to major field crops in the Northcentral.  Results show that the variance of 
own-commodity prices has a negative (and statistically significant) effect on soybean acreage, 
but is insignificant in affecting either corn or wheat acreage decisions.  Hence, CCPs’ production  
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking, Sandmo’s argument that a positive wealth effect in supply response implies DARA applies to a 
single commodity case (Sandmo).  In this context, the overall wealth elasticity of 0.03 for combined corn, soybeans 
and wheat acreage decisions is consistent with the DARA assumption commonly assumed in the literature (e.g., 
Arrow).   21
impact through the program’s risk-reducing effect is largely limited to soybeans, although has an 
indirect effect on corn acreage as well.  Additionally, if CCPs increase farm household’s income 
and wealth and affect the household’s initial wealth position in subsequent years, then the 
payments could have positive effects on soybean and wheat shares, partly at the expense of corn. 
 
Farmers receive no CCPs if the national average farm price is equal to or exceeds the effective 
CCP threshold price—target price minus direct decoupled payment rate.  Under the 2002 farm 
legislation, this threshold price for soybeans is $5.36/bu, or $5.80 (target price) minus $0.44 
(direct payment rate).  In an ex post sense, CCPs would appear to have little or no production 
impact when soybean farm prices exceed this threshold, as in recent years. 
 
However, in an ex ante context, CCPs could have potential effects on soybean acreage and 
indirectly on corn acreage even if prices exceeded the threshold due to the reduction of the 
variance of soybean prices.  Additional effects would result in relatively weak market conditions 
such as in the 2004/05 and ensuing marketing years, as projected in the USDA baseline (USDA).  
To illustrate, first, the truncation effects from soybean loan program on soybean price 
distribution are examined.  If farmers were to expect the national soybean farm price at $4.98/bu 
(based on new crop futures prices in February 2005), which is close to the $5.00/bu loan rate 
level and about 82 percent of the average during the 2002/03 -2004/05 period, the soybean loan 
program would truncate the farm price distribution from below at $5.00/bu.  Assuming an 
untruncated standard deviation of $0.55 for soybean farm prices—the average over the 1999 – 
2001 period and a normal distribution, the loan program would yield a truncated mean value of 
soybean farm prices at $5.43/bu and reduce the variance from $0.30/bu to $0.11/bu.  This higher   22
truncated mean and lower truncated variance reflect the truncation effects of the soybean loan 
program on moments of the truncated price distribution. 
 
Next, CCPs’ production impact is examined by comparing how moments of the soybean farm 
price distribution differ with and without CCPs.  In the absence of CCPs, price truncation effects 
are limited to the soybean loan program.  However, with CCPs, truncation of the price 
distribution includes the effects of both loan program and CCPs.  A $0.36/bu CCP rate would be 
in effect if farmers’ price expectation for soybeans ($4.98/bu) materialized.  However, it is 
important to note that CCPs are based on historical base acreage, which may differ from actual 
planted acreage.  Specifically, CCPs are made only on 85 percent of base acreage and the 
payment rate applies to the CCP payment yield, instead of actual yield.  Because CCPs are paid 
on less than full production, the $0.36/bu payment rate amounts to a lesser amount if apportioned 
to actual production.  For illustration, we assume $0.27 per production bushel is apportioned to 
actual production partly based on the estimated soybean acreage share equations and the above-
mentioned soybean farm price scenario.  Hence, combined loan program and CCPs would 
truncate soybean price distribution from below at $5.27/bu.   The effect of CCP truncation to the 
price distribution increases the mean value from $5.43/bu to $5.59/bu, and lowers the variance 
from $0.11/bu to $0.05/bu (see figure 5). 
 
Under this soybean price scenario, CCPs would lower the variance of soybean farm prices by 
49.9 percent, that is, (0.0538 – 0.1074)/0.1074 = - 49.91%.  Given the risk elasticity of -0.044, 
this reduction of 49.91 percent in soybean price variance would imply an increase of 2.20 





bushel apportioned to actual soybean production also increases the mean value of soybean prices 
by $0.159/bu—a 3-percent increase in soybean’s expected farm price.  Given the own-price 
acreage elasticity of 0.253 for the Northcentral region, this 3-percent increase in soybean’s 
expected farm price would increase soybean acreage by 0.74 percent.  As a result, CCPs would 
increase soybean acreage by 2.94 percent (2.20% + 0.74%) in this scenario. 
 
The higher mean and lower variance of soybean farm prices that are attributed to CCPs might 
have an indirect effect on corn acreage in the region.  Because the variance of soybean prices is 
not statistically significant in corn acreage, as shown in table 1, the lower variance of soybean 
%
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       ($5.59/bu.) 
Untruncated mean
        ($5.43/bu.) 
Variance: 
    Untruncated   $0.11/bu. 
    Truncated       $0.05/bu. 
Loan rate plus 
CCP  ($5.27/bu.) 
Figure 5.  CCP effects on soybean farm price distribution: 
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prices would not trigger an indirect effect on corn acreage.  However, given the cross-price 
elasticity of -0.227 with respect to soybean prices in corn acreage equation obtained from table 1, 
a 3-percent increase in the expected soybean prices triggered by CCPs would lead to a decrease 
of 0.68 percent in corn acreage. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Preliminary results from this study suggest that the effects of risk on supply response for major 
field crops in the Northcentral region are not strong.  Large, commercial farms have steadily 
increased their share of grain and oilseed production in the United States.  These commercial 
farms tend to pay more attention to the accumulation of net worth in the long-run than short-term 
risk involved in farming.  However, risk could still be important for individual farms. 
 
This study reaffirms that an increase in initial wealth would lead to greater acreage of major field 
crops, consistent with decreasing absolute risk aversion.  In the context of DARA, an increase in 
initial wealth would lessen producers’ risk aversion.  Hence, the positive wealth effect on 
soybean share is expected because expected variance of soybean prices was considerably higher 
than that for corn and wheat during 1991-97.  In addition, the expansion of soybean acreage 
resulting from the wealth increase is consistent with the rising trend in soybean’s share of the 
combined corn and soybean acres during the 1990s.  In contrast, corn acreage contracts, as corn 
and soybeans compete for the same cropland. 
  
CCPs appear to have a modest impact on production of major field crops in the Northcentral 
region.   However, effects of CCPs may go beyond their short-run effects on farmers’ acreage 
decisions; longer term, there may be structural implications to the extent that these payments   25
keep farmers in business.  In addition to commodity loan programs, CCPs are another safety net 
measure that protects farmers from adverse effects of weak market prices.  To farmers who are 
financially distressed, CCPs could provide help necessary for them to remain in farming.  
 
Finally, CCPs would likely exert additional production impacts in an intertemporal framework if 
they increase farm households’ income and wealth accumulation (Burfisher and Hopkins, ed. 
2003, 2004).  As demonstrated by Chavas and Holt and this study, initial wealth is shown to have 
an important effect on farmers’ acreage decisions.  More research is needed to understand 
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